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Abstract
This paper investigates the key drivers and key inhibitors from an Information System (IS) Security and Business
Continuity Planning (BCP) perspective in the context of a round table forum. The study identifies key issues
across a broad cross-section of government organisations, such as awareness and active management support,
training and appropriate funding, that will be useful to management when implementing IS Security and
undertaking Business Continuity Planning over e-government within agencies.
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INTRODUCTION
Information system security has previously concentrated on confidentiality of documents stored electronically.
In terms of the public perception of government organisations, security means the protection of records and data
that are held for the purpose of administering the acts and policies of government agencies. This applies equally
to paper documents as well as the data held on computer databases (Kiel, 2003). The rapid growth in the
volume of information stored electronically and the uptake of e-commerce within government has heightened
the need for increased security to protect the privacy of this information and prevent fraudulent activities
(Bradford, 1999).
Electronic information is extremely portable and also very easy to modify. The administration, business and
legal processes associated with security and protection of electronic government information have not been fully
developed (Scott, 2003). Consequently government projects are endeavouring to develop policies and
procedures to improve security (Frank, 2003). From the public’s perspective, government is seen as one entity,
hence a security problem within one agency may be viewed as a failure of the whole of government process.
Therefore the process of improving security within the Whole of Government (WOG) is viewed as an essential
project. The research discussed in this paper forms part of a longitudinal action research study to help inform
and improve security within WOG. This paper reports on an initial research study, which involved a forum of
key agencies to determine the key drivers and inhibitors for information system security and business continuity
planning (BCP) within WOG.
The Australian Standard AS17799 (AS17799, 2000, 2003) Information Technology contains ten major sections
of which nine deal with security issues and one section deals with Business Continuity Planning. Since the
agencies are required to achieve compliance to the standard, the forum questions were grouped around the
Security and Business Continuity Planning areas of the standard.
Definitions of IS Security and BCP
IS Security (ISS) is effective implementation of policies to ensure the confidentiality, availability and integrity
of information and assets is protected from theft, tampering, manipulation or corruption. BCP is planning to
mitigate the adverse effects of an unexpected catastrophe, which may result in the loss of services, operations or
information for a period of time.
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RESEARCH METHODS
A forum was conducted on the 4th April 2003 at the Office of Information Technology, to determine the key
drivers and key inhibitors to Information System Security and Business Continuity Planning. At the end of the
forum, a roundtable disaster scenario was discussed. Eleven representatives from nine NSW government
agencies, with both technical and management backgrounds, attended the forum. The agencies ranged in size
from small agencies (approx. 20 staff), through medium sized agencies (approx. 200 staff), to large agencies
(over 1000 staff members). Of these agencies, one had achieved accreditation to the AS/NZS 17799 standard,
one had not started their accreditation process and the other were in the process of achieving accrediation.
The research forum involved a focus group, which is one the most common methods of qualitative research.
Forum attendees consisted of nine IS Security Agency managers who were involved in a series of questionfocused, scenario-based activities guided by a facilitator. The advantage of this group discussion forum method
is that it enabled participates to firstly brainstorm ideas, and then discuss the ideas prior to rating and ranking the
issues disclosed. The forum created an atmosphere that allowed open interaction, stimulating discussion and a
flexible environment in which to discover the perceptions and experiences of the individual participants. The
forum also uncovered concepts and generated new ideas on the topics being discussed.
The focus of the forum was to determine the key drivers and key inhibitors of IS Security and Business
Continuity Planning from a WOG perspective. This research project is essential for government as it highlights
a range of difficulties faced by agencies when charged with the responsibility to improve/implement their ISS
and BCP plans. The forum identified and allowed the discussion of initiatives developed within the individual
agencies that may be of benefit across government to improve information security.
The research questions addressed by this study include:
1.

What do you see as the key drivers for successful IS Security for your agency?

2.

What do you see as the key inhibitors to successful IS Security for your agency?

3.

What do you see as the key drivers for BCP to work in your agency?

4.

What do you see as the key inhibitors to successful BCP for your agency?

The issues raised in the forum were scaled by Rank and Rating
•

Rank – ranking order of preference (1,2,3…n). This task required the participant to order the issues
from the first issue, number “1” (most important) to the last issue last number in sequence (least
important). The analysis involved sorting the ranking issued from the most to least important.

•

Rating – Estimated magnitude of importance of each issue. This task required the participant to
estimate the degree of importance of the individual issue. The scale used was a Likert Scale ranging
from 7 being the most important to 1 being unimportant. The analysis involved averaging the ratings
across all the participants the sorting them in reverse order from the most to least important, thus the
average closest to “7” was the rated the most important issue.

The results from each of these questions will be discussed in the following sections.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY
Key Drivers for Successful IS Security
The first focus question discussed at the forum related to identifying key drivers for IS Security. The
participants identified the following key drivers, which are set out in Table 1. These are the major factors which
should contribute for successful IS Security within government agencies.
Table 1 shows the average rankings of these key drivers and the average importance ratings given by the
participants to each driver.
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Key Drivers For Successful IS Security
Active support of senior management
Commitment of funding
Protection of assets
Statutory / legislative requirements
Staff awareness & training
Maintain integrity of electronic records
Bad experience can drive change
Compliance with standards eg AS17799
Extensive consultation with stakeholders and users
Inter-departmental requirement for sharing and the alignment of
standards
Security must be accessible for users
Awareness levels of security for differing systems
External pressure eg bad press
Access to appropriate information
Move to electronic process increase security concerns
Need to develop private access to information eg VPN
Planned staged approach to understanding security awareness and
training
Desire to become a best practice organization

Ave
Rank2

Ranked
Importce
Rating3

Average
Rating4

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

1
2
3
7
5
4
11
8
6
12

6.6
6.2
6.1
5.6
5.7
5.7
5.0
5.3
5.7
5.0

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

9
17
13
14
16
10
15

5.1
4.6
5.0
4.8
4.7
5.1
4.8

18

18

4.3

Table 1 - Key Drivers For Successful IS Security
The issues transcribed from the forum are an accurate summary of the discussion that took place. All issues
were rated above 4.3 (> moderately important) indicating that all of these issues are worth considering by
management as factors that drive successful ISS within e-government. In order to differentiate between issues,
rnaking was carried out which revealed the thee major issues in Table 1 that are key to successful IS Security.
These are:
•

the active support of management

•

sufficient funding

•

staff awareness and training.

Comments from the participants emphasise these issues. The important elements of the comments spoken in the
forum on the need for Senior Management Support include:
“… supported by senior management … the resources are given to you and it’s an achievable
outcome …” (Participant 10)
This key driver was ranked the most important issue and rated number 1 in priority. The need for Management
support is essential and necessary as it is senior management that is charged with the task of initiating and
supporting important projects both with funding and resources within an organisation. The raising of this issue
so highly in this forum indicates that although IS security concerns have been recognised by the IT department
for many years, senior management has yet to fully appreciated its importance within the business framework.
The failure of senior management to fully support IS security is limited by the expectation of the outcome
measured against the performance of other projects within the organisation. It may be difficult for management
to approve ongoing funding for security projects that do not generate profit or reduce costs.
Following on from the issue of Senior Management Support is the Statutory/Legal requirements which not only
affect the integrity of the business but may place legal requirement on a Director/CEO and other senior
management of an organisation.
2

Rank (of the order assigned by each participant and averaged then ordered).

3

Rating (of the importance ranking 1-7 for each issue raised. This data was totalled then averaged and ordered).

4

Average Rating The descending order of the average ratings across all participants.
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“… (the) main driver is reducing our agency exposure whether it’s our losses, legal liability,
downtime or service loss …” (Participant 1)
This issue has major implications across the whole of an organisation as its exposure may cause loss of
confidential information, loss of reputation or financial losses. This in turn may result in systems having to be
temporarily removed from public access until solution patches are applied or law enforcements service
investigates any alleged security breaches. If service levels agreements have been established a loss of services
may results in contractual penalties or legal action.
Other major issue identified is the issue of Awareness and Training
“… Staff awareness and training, people need to know what is expected of them and they (need)
to know the basis of the issues of security so they know what they have to contend with and what is
expected of them so we need to make them aware and do what’s necessary … we all know where
we stand … ” (Participant 9)
With a dynamic workforce it is difficult to maintain a functional pool of knowledge regarding the safe and
effective operation of business systems. As new staff commence their duties most of the knowledge conveyed
by colleagues is about the process rather than concentrating of the security components of the business process.
Until a staff member has been through orientation and received the necessary security training, the risk of unsafe
business processes is increased. When staff are fully trained, it is crucial that they are aware of the
responsibility of their role and responsibilities.
Key Inhibitors to Successful IS Security
The second focus question discussed related to identifying key inhibitors to successful IS Security. The
participants identified the following key inhibitors, which are set out in Table 2. These are the major factors
which would inhibit successful IS Security within government agencies.
Table 2 shows the average rankings of these key drivers and the average importance ratings given by the
participants to each driver.
Key Inhibitors to Successful IS Security
Security needs to part of development process
Lack of management awareness
Lack of training for all staff
Lack of allocated funds due to low priority
No BAD experiences so it is assumed that everything is ok
Resistance to set up a uniform user interface across the organisation
Lack of consistency of risk management processes across the
breadth of organization
Expectation of uses to be able to access all information when they
want.
Security will hinder productivity
Lack of awareness of the importance of information
Lack of monitoring security logs of incidents unusual events
Low skill base (lack of skills transfer from contractors)
Lack of integration Security with organisation culture
The size, complexity of new software development
Security is only an it issue
No business rules to integrate non-electronic processes (documents)
with e-business systems
Security may look simple but may have a complicated back end
Lack of documentation for security processes
Changing user requirements
Resources required to classify information by the level of security
Technology advances cause a rethink of security structure

Rank

Rating

Av.
Rating

1

1

6.7

2
3
4
5
6

3
4
8
2
5

6.0
5.9
5.4
6.2
5.7

7

17

4.7

8
9
10
11

6
7
9
10

5.7
5.6
5.4
5.4

12
13
14

11
12
13

5.4
5.4
5.2

15
16
17
18
19

14
15
16
18
19

5.2
5.0
5.0
4.7
4.6

Table 2 - Key Inhibitors to Successful IS Security
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Once again all inhibitors raised rated above 4.6 (> moderately important) and hence all should be considered as
key factors that may inhibit successful IS security within government agencies. The major issue identified as an
inhibitor is the issue of Management Awareness. This issue not only scored the highest in “Rating” it was also
“Ranked” the most important.
“Lack of awareness that information is generated belongs to the organisation … ” (Participant 4)
The awareness of information as an important resource not only needs to be recognised by staff but also by
senior management. The collection and processing of any information collected by an organisation will inturn
be subsequently used by an organisation to make discussions about its customers and services. These decisions
can be business, financial, personal and even life threatening, the protection of this information from fraudulent
or accidental tampering is vital and a management responsibility.
“… the perception or assumption with security is solely an IT responsibly rather than recognising
that it affects the whole business …” (Participant 6)
This quote continues from the previous comment where management needs to aware of the significance of the
relationship between business processes and the IT departments responsibility for security. Just because the IT
department develops/operates the business systems, the information contained within belongs to the
organisation. Therefore, security of business information cannot be solely handled to the IT department.
“… IS security is a necessary evil which hindered productivity …” (Participant 1)
This comment is one of the most common complaints levelled at security from the operational area. It is
probably also true, effective security has to be intrusive to some degree to offer an appropriate level of protection.
One of the aims of a security system designer is to try to make security as easy as practical to implement and use
even though the back end development systems can be quite elaborate.

BUSINESS CONTINUITY PLANNING (BCP)
Key Drivers Business Continuity Planning (BCP)
The third focus question discussed at the forum relate to identifying key drivers for BCP. The participants
identified the following key drivers, which are set out in Table 3. These are the major factors which should
contribute to successful BCP within government agencies.
Table 3 shows the average rankings of these key drivers and the average importance ratings given by the
participants to each driver.
Rank Rating
Key Drivers for BCP To Work In Your Agency
Recognise that business is the driver not information technology
Standards and legislation for vital records may be enforceable
Use experienced external consultants to improve skilling of staff
Previous poor experience
Assigning appropriate levels of authority
Integration of organisational and community needs if applicable
To protect critical information
BCP to encompass the “whole” organisation (planning phase)
Maintaining integrity of information / security / processes
Review plans on a regular basis (keep them current)
BCP integrate into process cycles eg hr, finance etc
Awareness of third party requirements / expectations / and their
realisation of your capabilities eg audit both internal & external
CEO awareness integral to planning & day-to-day management of
business for BCP
Dedicated staff responsibility
Political imperatives spotlight external issues eg service to public,
terrorism threats

Av.
Rating

1
2
3
4
5
7
6
8
9
10
11
12

1
5
3
4
2
6
9
7
8
10
11
15

6.9
5.9
6.1
6.0
6.2
5.8
5.3
5.8
5.6
5.2
5.2
4.7

13

13

5.1

14
15

14
12

4.8
5.2

Table 3 - Key Drivers for BCP To Work In Your Agency
All factors raised were rated above 4.7 ( > moderately important) indicating that all of these issues are worth
considering by management as factors that drive successful BCP within e-government. Once again the ranking
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in the table differentiates between the issues. The most common issue on BCP Drivers was based on the
following comment:
“ … That the business is the driver of BCP and not IT driving that …” (Participant 9)
Business needs to be fully attentive of the union between business and the BCP. This means not isolating itself
from being a stakeholder in the plan and allowing the IT department to lead the process. Although the
development of a BCP is usually charged to the IT department, it will become an IT Disaster Recovery Plan
(DRP) unless business and management are serious about having an active role in its development, testing and
review.
“…. when you read 7799 (AS17799) it clearly says that BCP is an integral component of gaining
that accreditation …” (Participant 3)
Essentially an effective level of security includes an effective and tested BCP.
“…. it not an imaginary concept, it is real it is a pragmatic approach to managing their business
in a day-to-day environment …” (Participant 4)
BCP is not a document that is quickly assembled and reported to management that the task of BCP is now
completed. BCP is dynamic, organic and involves the active participation of the entire organisation. It is more
about the culture of the process to create an effective process rather than just a document. It also requires
continual updates, testing and is a living document.
Key Inhibitors to Successful BCP
The last focus question discussed relates to identifying key inhibitors to BCP. The participants identified the
following key inhibitors, which are set out in Table 4. These are the major factors, which may contribute to
inhibiting successful to BCP within government agencies.
Table 4 shows the average rankings of these key drivers and the average importance ratings given by the
participants to each driver.
Rank Rating
Key Inhibitors to Successful BCP
Lack of awareness
Failure to recognise that business is the driver not information
technology
Where IT fits into the business model
Lack of allocated and availability of funds for clearly identifiable
business plans
Training at all levels to increase awareness
Lack of capacity / resources to test BCP
Lack of current and appropriate "BCP"
Incomplete "asset register" & other bits that "hook into" plan
Lack of knowledge of "what is it you are trying to protect"
Changing environment should be a trigger for review of plan
Inconsistency of plan across organization
Lack of awareness and understanding of BCP
Lack of co-ordinated reporting within the organisation

Av.
Rating

1
2

1
2

6.7
6.3

3
4

3
4

6.1
5.9

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

5
6
8
10
9
7
12
11
13

5.9
5.9
5.6
5.6
5.6
5.7
5.0
5.2
4.8

Table 4 - Key Inhibitors to Successful BCP
All BCP inhibitors raised rated above 4.8 (> moderately important) and hence all should be considered as key
factors that may inhibit successful BCP within government agencies. Once again the awareness issue has been
raised as the one of the key inhibitors for BCP within agencies. In this research question, Awareness was both
rated and ranked as number 1.
“…. lack of awareness of the need at an executive level because of the perception of no real risk
….” (Participant 1)
Some risk managers would rate the chance of a catastrophic event occurring to an organisation, requiring the
implementation of their BCP, as once in a lifetime. This however, does not negate management of the
responsibility of preparing a BCP to account for a catastrophic event occurring.
“…. lack of capacity to test 24/7 …” (Participant 3)
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There can be a lack of resources or capacity within the business or IT systems to fully test an organisation’s
BCP. Some business systems cannot be shut down or switched off-line to be tested because they are mission
critical or sometime life threatening. It then becomes a management decision to determine the appropriate BCP
testing strategy based upon the associated risks to the organisation.
“… you can have a plan that covers every aspect of your business …” (Participant 6)
This comment may be a little optimistic, but in the event of a disaster, which requires the implementation of the
BCP, at least all major aspects of the business need to be addressed by the plan. This is usually determined by
an appropriate business impact analysis (BIA) being undertaken.

DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
There was a very good correlation between the ‘ranked’ order and the ‘rating’ order of the top 5 issues raised at
the forum. The correlation can be seen in the connectivity (arrows) between the ranking and rating columns of
Tables 1 - 4. This further re-affirms the importance of the issues raised and the reliability of the individual
measures of the ranking and rating.
One major limitation of this study is that it only focused on the practices of nine government agencies. Also, it
should also be noted that only high-level issues were covered and while the issues were significant, the purpose
was to identify them. None of them were explored in detail and this remain an area for future research.
As a final point, there is no overall corporate governance for the whole of Government. Each agency has the
autonomy to set their individual processes and to achieve accreditation to AS17799.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The purpose of this paper was to determine the key issues that exist with IS Security and BCP then rank and rate
them accordingly. The summary of the main issues across the four focus questions of the forum includes the
majority of the four following issues:
1.

Training

2.

Management Support

3.

Budget / Cost / Resources

4.

Awareness

While not all of the above four issues are applicable to all organisation or agencies they would appear to be
relevant to a large number of organisations as key drivers or key inhibitors. It should be noted that the positive
effects from an organisations successful IS Security and BCP programs should result in the ability to continue to
obtain Management Support.
This study illustrates the perception of IS Security and BCP issues that are held within government
organisations. The second phase in this e-government research program is to expand the coverage of the forum,
by interviewing the remaining government agencies, using the same set of four research questions and allowing
them to rate and rank the issues raised by this forum.
The forum results reinforce the requirement of the BCP to be an integral part of an organisation’s business plan,
not an IT ‘tack on’. Even though IT is usually the custodian of the plan, this does not imply that the IT
department is the driving force behind its development, maintenance and testing.
In conclusion, running the same exercise with non-government agencies that are also attempting to achieve
accreditation to AS17799 would be beneficial as a comparative study and be of practical assistance to
commercial organisations.
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